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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing, and 
Financial Management at the International Hellenic University. 
Audit quality has been a blockbuster topic in the international accounting literature the 
last few years. However, there are very few evidence concerning audit quality of the finan-
cial institutions. Specifically, as far as to my knowledge, there are not any studies on audit 
quality for the banking industry in the USA for the years 2000-2015. The purpose of this 
study is to focus in this particular time of period and identify the quality determinants of 
audit work supplying to commercial and multiple-service banks of USA. With the imple-
mentation of a common practice of earnings management and more especially with the 
use of the discretionary accruals related to the constitution of the Loan Loss Provision 
(LLP), we have delineated audit quality. 
We have also separated our main sample in two different sub-samples having as breaking-
point the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. Particularly, the first sub-sample pertains 
to the post-crisis period, 2000-2007, and the second the following years, 2008-2015. This 
deviation of our sample has the purpose to add further importance to our research and to 
link our results with the apparition of the financial crisis. Subsequently, based on the litera-
ture we have created five different hypotheses as far as the possible audit quality determi-
nants and their association to it. Particularly, the first refers to Big-4 and nonBig-4 compa-
nies, the second to client’s importance into the auditors’ portfolio, the third to the litiga-
tion against audit companies, the next to the effectiveness of audit committees of the 
banks and the last one to the concentration in the audit industry. Of the empirically tested 
hypotheses, no one depicts any statistically significant result. We have pointed out de-
tailed possible reasons for not obtaining any significant information as far as our devel-
oped hypotheses, based on theoretical frameworks and possible model errors. Finally, we 
conclude with some suggestions for possible future research and discussions that arise 
from this specific study. 
Keywords: audit quality, banks, earnings management, discretional accruals 
Sherolli Xhensila 
November 10, 2016
   -iv- 
Acknowledgements  
I am grateful for the comments and suggestions from my instructor Dr. Leventis 
Sergios, senior lecturer in accounting in International Hellenic University and 
Mr.Antonios Chantziaras, Ph.D. Student in Accounting in International Hellenic Univer-
sity, for his contribution to the data analysis. Also Mr. Peter Kondogouris, president of 
NAMCO SA, for his financial and intellectual support for the accomplishment of my 
MSc studies. Last but not least, my working area, my family and my fiancé for being 
extremely helpful with their patient and understanding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   -v- 
Preface 
Τable 1 ................................................................................................................. 24 
Table 2 ................................................................................................................. 25 
Table 3 ................................................................................................................. 27 
Table 4 ................................................................................................................. 29 
Table 5 ................................................................................................................. 37 
Table 6 ................................................................................................................. 38 
Table 7(Model 1 Sub-sample 2000-2007)........................................................... 39 
Table 8 (Model 1 Sub-sample 2008-2015) .......................................................... 39 
Table 9 (Model 1 Full-Sample 2000-2015) .......................................................... 40 
Table 10(Model 2 Sub-sample 2000-2007)......................................................... 40 
Table 11(Model 2 Sub-sample 2008-2015)......................................................... 41 
Table 12(Model 2 Full-sample 2000-20015) ....................................................... 41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   -vi- 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........................................................................................IV 
PREFACE ..................................................................................................................V 
CONTENTS ..............................................................................................................VI 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................... 5 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES ........................................................ 9 
3.1 BIG-4 OR NONBIG-4 AUDIT FIRMS ................................................................................ 9 
3.2 CLIENT’S IMPORTANCE IN AUDITORS PORTFOLIO ............................................................ 10 
3.3 LITIGATION AGAINST AUDITORS .................................................................................. 12 
3.4  CONCENTRATION OF AUDIT SECTOR ............................................................................ 13 
3.5 INTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS ................................................................................. 16 
4. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 19 
5. DATA ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ......................................................................... 24 
6. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 31 
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 33 
7. APPENDIX ......................................................................................................... 37 
 [1] 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Banks all over the world have to conform to certain requirements and regula-
tions regarding their operations and the information they provide to external parties 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, March 2014). However, the recent financial 
crisis revealed weaknesses in many areas of the banking sector. Particularly in fields 
such as controlling, risk management and governance procedure highlighting, simulta-
neously, the necessity of improvement in the quality of external auditing procedures in 
the financial institutions.  
External auditors can play a significant role mainly in two factors: i) In contrib-
uting effectively to the reduction of the information asymmetries that exist between 
internal managers and external bank’s stakeholders and ii) to ensure the financial sta-
bility by delivering quality audits which hearten market confidence in banks’ financial 
statements.  Comprehensively, auditing allows outsiders to confirm the validity and 
the reliability of financial statements. It is an effective form of monitoring used by 
companies and banks to eliminate agency costs with stockholders and debt holders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1983). However, if the auditing 
quality is insufficient, the relevant information can mislead supervisors, governments 
and investors resulting in devastating outcomes. In other words, the expected benefit 
of auditing procedure can be gained only if the quality of audit service that is rendered 
is high (Kavut, 2001). 
The primary product of an audit produced by the CPA1 is the audit report, 
which is the interface of communication between the auditor, the bank, and the 
stakeholders. This audit report should reflect the auditor’s opinion regarding the bank 
and with a reasonable assurance to ensure third parties that the bank’s accounting and 
stewardship are correct (SFS2 1999, p. 1079). In other words, the auditor indicates the 
scope of his/her examination by issuing an opinion on the reliability of accounting in-
formation. This process contributes and enhances the business environment and pro-
                                                     
1
 Certified Public Accountant is the accountant with the qualified title of qualified in different countries in 
the worl,d particularly in English-speaking. 
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motes characteristic such as the trust and the credibility (Newman, Patterson & Smith, 
2005; Ojo, 2008; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS], 2008; Zagonov, 
2011). 
However, the numerous corporate scandals at the beginning of the century, 
which were dominated by frauds and accounting manipulations, raise many debates 
about the scope of responsibilities of auditors, taking into consideration that their 
opinion on financial statements did not change. Even the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
which was a reaction to these scandals in the United States, aiming to reduce the self-
regulation power of auditors, did not prevent the forthcoming global financial crisis of 
2008. In the assessments of the factors of the crisis, the supervising authorities high-
light the “worrying lack of skepticism” and strongly questioned the role of auditors to 
anticipate the banking problems (Sanderson, 2010).  
Many financial institutions around the world were bailed out or were bankrupt 
since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. For example, Lehman Brothers2 in-
vestigation reports demonstrate that the financial institution manipulated its financial 
reports using artificial accounts and hiding debts. Ernst & Young (E&Y) which was the 
audit companies responsible for the audit quality of financial statements of Lehman 
Brothers was accused of serious misallocations that contributed to the failure of the 
institution.  
Hence, the performance of auditors has a direct contribution in the ensuring 
the credibility of the financial market. Additionally, the reliability of financial reporting 
is an essential condition for the functioning of the banking system because they are 
exposed to numerous risks, including the risk of “bank run” in the case of suspicion by 
depositors. In summary, there is an important and objective connection between the 
mission of auditors to ensure the stability and the reliability of the information about 
the banking system, as they have a vital impact on the global economy.   
                                                     
2
 Lehman Brothers Holdings was an international financial services Company which operated for 158 
years, from 1850 until 2008. Before the bankruptcy in 2008, Lehman Brothers was the fourth larg-
est investment bank in the USA. It was operated mainly by doing banking investment, equity, and fixed-
income sales also by trading particularly in U.S. Treasury.  
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Notwithstanding, Kanagaretnam, Lim and Lobo (2010) stated that  there are 
not much evidence of research that deals particularly with audit quality in the financial 
industry, while there is ample of research of audit quality in non-financial sector exist-
ing in the international literature since the study of  DeAngelo (1981). The importance 
of studies on audit quality in the financial sector, especially in the wake of the financial 
crisis, can be originated from the most representative cases of audit failures analysed 
in the international media, which are the cases of fraud or mismanagement committed 
by banks, such as the bankruptcy of “Lehman Brothers”, “Washington Mutual”3, and 
“Independent National Mortgage Corporation”4, which lead to many questions relating 
to the provided audit quality and to their auditors. 
While the majority of literature emphasizes the role of sub-prime lending and 
loan securitization as factors of the financial crisis and the bankruptcies, this research 
focuses on evaluating external auditing quality issues and variables. However, audit 
quality is an unobservable variable (Power, 1997). As a result, there are not any offi-
cially recognized measurements in the academic literature. This difficulty in calculating 
audit quality is emphasized by the statement of the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision (BCBS, 2008) which states that there are no objective tools to measure audit 
quality, even though the continuous studies in this direction. Also, the US Treasury De-
partment’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP) formulates sugges-
tions for enforcing audits and recommends the PCAOB to develop key indicators of au-
dit quality (Carcello, Bedard, & Hermanson, 2009). 
A clear consensus as to which approach is best suited to an audit quality re-
search does not exist. Taking into consideration this objective difficulty of simultane-
ously verifying and measuring it, the primary object of this study is 
to examine different audit quality determinants of the banking sector in two different 
                                                     
3
 Washington Mutual, was the largest savings and loan association until 2008, when it collapses. It was 
a savings bank holding company and also the former owner of Washington Mutual Bank.  
4
 IndyMac was a contraction of Independent National Mortgage Corporation based in California. It failed 
in 2008 and was seized by the FDIC. 
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periods. The first period refers to the years 2000-2007 before the financial crisis, 
whether the second period includes data from the following years, 2008-2015. As a 
proxy for audit quality was used the method of earnings management and particularly, 
the discretionary accrual associated with the process of Loan Loss Provision. 
As the quality of audit work can be influenced by multiple factors, by using previous 
empirical research, the most significant of them were identified and tested in or-
der to clarify their relationship with the audit quality. The factors that were allocated 
as more crucial and were used are the i) Big-4 or nonBig-4 audit companies; ii) client’s 
importance in auditors portfolio; iii) litigation against auditors; iv) internal audit effec-
tiveness v) concentration of the audit sector;.  
Tests were performed by using yearly financial information which was obtained 
from Bankscope Database of 312 commercial, savings and multiple-service banks of 
the USA for the decade 2000-2015. The selection of this sample was based on the 
availability and the update of the financial information in the database. The results 
aim to contribute to a more effective understanding of audit work undertaken by au-
diting companies at the banking sector, to investigate the association of audit quality 
with the recent financial crisis and to fill a gap in the literature of this matter. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As already stated, audit quality is a vital tool for the functioning of the global 
economy by ensuring the confidence and credibility of capital and financial markets. 
Focusing on it, there are many interesting approaches that can be elicited from the lit-
erature review. In addition, audit market’s participants have conflicting roles and dif-
ferent expectations that may lead to dissimilar interpretations of audit quality (Sutton, 
1993). As a result, in the literature, there are many different explanations and ways of 
measuring it, leading to subjectivity and ambiguity in the term of audit quality (Ras-
mussen & Jensen, 1998; Watkins et al., 2004). 
A first and most widely used definition of audit quality was achieved  by DeAn-
gelo et al. (1981, p.186), stating that “the quality of audit services is defined to be the 
market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in 
the client's accounting system, and report the breach”. A few years later Palmrose et 
al. (1988) research presented another aspect of the audit, the level of assurance. Palm-
rose based his theory on the fact that the actual purpose of an audit is to give assur-
ance on financial statements, so he reported that audit quality is the possibility that 
statements do not contain any material misstatements. Based on this assumption it 
would be reasonable to declare that the quality of external audit should be linked to 
the quality of the financial reports or in other words accounting information may also 
reflect the accuracy and the quality of the external audit.  
Another acceptable definition is given also from GAO5 (2003, reported by Be-
dard et al. 2010) which defines a high-quality audit as “an audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards to provide reasonable assurance that the au-
dited financial statements and related disclosures are presented in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and are not materially misstated whether due 
                                                     
5 
Government Accountability Office is a government agency which provides auditing, evaluation, and 
investigative services for the US Congress. 
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to errors or fraud”. Whether, it defines audit failure as: “Issuing an erroneous audit 
opinion as the result of an underlying failure to comply with the requirements of Gen-
erally Accepted Auditing Standards” (Arens et al., 2008) 
Except for the variations in definitions, there are also numerous proxies used 
by researchers to calculate the quality of the audit based to Braun-beck (2010) theo-
ries. Examining the quality of audits using the quality of accounting information con-
siders as an intuitive reasoning that the more accurate the quality of the audit, the 
higher the quality of the information disclosed and vice verse. 
Thoroughly, financial statements are the most immediate way for banks to ex-
hibit the outcome of their operation. Their financial statements include information 
about the financial structure and the operating results of a bank. This information can 
be vital not only for the bank itself but also for: i) the parties who are interested in it 
and do not have any possible entrance to obtain direct information and confirm it and 
ii) for the global economy due to the systemic risk. A first approach to connecting 
these two events was achieved from Titman and Trueman (1986), stated also in Behn 
and Choi (2008) who suggested that high audit quality would enhance the reliability of 
financial statement and gave the chance to investors to achieve more precise estima-
tions for company’s value. More recently, Schauer (2002) stated that the financial 
statements can more rationally reflect the financial position of the entity being au-
dited. That means that audit quality is an integral part of the quality of the accounting 
information disclosed (Clinch 2010). This fact per se highlights the importance of the 
auditing of the financial statement and especially in the financial institution. 
As far as the banking sector concerns, the most useful information that is con-
sidered more associated with both the quality of financial statement and the audit 
quality, is the earnings management. In this regard, the practice of earnings manage-
ment, particularly the use of discretionary accruals, is a benchmark widely used to 
measure the audit quality. Earnings management in unison with the auditor’s size and 
expertise is the most used measurements in the literature on the audit quality (Gul, 
Fung & Bikki, 2009). Particularly, earnings management can offer useful information as 
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far as the equity valuation and the firm’s sources of income which are considered as a 
very important indicator of quality to outside investors (Penman and Sougiannis, 1998; 
Barth, 2001). 
The banking industry, when compared to other sectors, has been characterized 
as more susceptible to earnings manipulation (Greenawalt and Sinkey 1988). Scheiner 
(1981) by examining a sample of US banks concluded that LLPs6 are the most impor-
tant and most commonly used, by banks, for managing earnings. Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988) also provide important evidence that managers of banks tend to in-
crease LLPs during periods of unusually high earnings in order to smooth the volatility 
of reported earnings. There are also many other studies supporting the aforemen-
tioned, especially focusing on US banks, concluded that LLPs are used as a tool for ag-
gressive earnings management, mainly for stock market purposes (Scholes et al. 1990; 
Collins et al. 1995; Liu and Ryan 1995;  Beaver and Engel 1996; Liu et al. 1997; Ahmed 
et al. 1999; Healy and Wahlen 1999;). Even in studies concerning non-US banks, the 
conclusions tend to be similar (Anandarajan et al. 2003, 2007; Pérez et al. 2008). 
Schipper (1989) is considered as one of the first that has tried to connect the 
earnings management with the auditing quality. He assumed that earnings manage-
ment are a non-neutral financial disclosure which resources from the intentional inter-
ference of managers in order to create personal gain, whether from the other side the 
auditors are responsible for acting in order to ensure the accuracy of the disclosure. 
Among others, Vincent et al. (2003) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) reinforce this role 
of auditors as agents responsible for the elimination of the discretionary action of a 
bank manager, so they act to restrict and limit the actions that may be recognized as 
manipulation of the actual economic and financial circumstances of a bank. 
Also, Dang (2004) has been referred to the link between audit and earnings 
management by supporting that the main role of the auditors is to reduce the informa-
tion asymmetry, concluding that audit quality should be associated with a lower 
                                                     
6 Loan losses provision. 
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amount of information asymmetry and uncertainty as far as the performance of the 
financial institution. Based on this rationale the quality of audit should be negatively 
related to the earnings management. 
Due to these reasons, explained above, the proxy of audit quality which is used 
in the particular study is based on a commonly used practice of earnings management, 
the discretionary accruals. The main assumption is that opportunistic manipulations of 
financial statements influence the quality of the disclosure. As a result of this practice 
would be a non-qualitative audit indicating that the auditor did not achieve to fulfil 
their goal which is to eliminate the neutrality of the statements. 
 [9] 
 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
After identifying the audit quality proxy with the practice of earnings management, 
particularly the discretionary accruals of LLPs and the use of a model based on the 
previous empirical result, the next step would be the clarification of audit quality 
determinants and development of different hypotheses as far as their influence on 
the result of an audit. 
3.1 Big-4 or NonBig-4 Audit Firms 
The first determinant would be the Big-4 and nonBig-4 issues. Many studies 
have investigated the assumption that Big-4 firms provide a higher quality of audit-
ing than nonBig-4 firms. Theoretical support of such a differentiation was provided 
firstly by DeAngelo (1981). He demonstrates analytically that the big audit compa-
nies have greater incentives to detect and prevent management misreporting, also, 
because Big-4 firms are extremely bigger than their competitors, it follows from 
that they are of higher quality. There are also empirical studies of Teoh and Wong 
(1993) that obtain documented evidence confirming the DeAngelo's analysis. 
Other researchers (St. Pierre and Anderson 1984) depict a lower incidence of 
litigation among Big-4 auditors compared to nonBig-4 auditors. In addition, DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1991), determining errors, irregularities, and manipulations as a 
form of earnings management and hypothesize that clients of the Big-4 companies 
are less likely to implement them in their administration policy. Moreover, even 
though they excluded from their sample fraudulent firms, they also state that dis-
agreements between auditor and client from different incentives to manage earn-
ings are possible to occur when firms have Big-4 auditors (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1993). 
In 1999 Lennox supported that the brand name and the size of the compa-
nies that offers audit services could be a reliable indicator of audit quality. This sug-
gestion was justified by many others. Particularly, Defond et al. (2014) claimed that 
Big-4 audit companies can offer a higher quality audit, considering their scale; they 
have access to a greater variety of resources related to facilities, equipment, tech-
 [10] 
 
nology, and training (Craswell et al. 1995; Francis et al. 1999; Chaney et al. 2004; 
Khurana and Raman 2004). In addition, Big-4 audit firms are supposed to be more 
independent than non Big-4 based on the case that they suffer extensive reputa-
tional risk, they depend less on an individual client’s payment and as a result, they 
would not possibly be swayed or influenced by an individual client. Moreover, their 
higher revenues expose them to greater litigation risk (Bonner et al. 1998; Skinner 
and Srinivasan 2012; DeFond and Zhang 2014) 
A few years before also Dye (1993) had depicted the same assumption. The 
most recent research was presented by Francis and Yu (2009) who agrees that the 
members of audit committee perceive that audit firm size and reputation together 
with the particular auditor experience and tenure have a significant influence on the 
quality of the audit service. These studies suggest a positive correlation between 
audit quality and Big-4 audit firms. In spite of the extensive amount of studies that 
analyze audit quality by using the dichotomous variable of Big-4, the debate re-
mains on their ability to measure the actual audit quality. However, based on the 
majority of the empirical studies the first hypothesis to be tested, as far as the Big-4 
and nonBig-4 is the below:  
H1:  The audit quality in USA banks is positively associated with the case that 
the audit company is one of the Big-4. 
3.2 Client’s Importance in Auditors Portfolio 
Another fact that influences audit quality is the client’s importance in the 
portfolio of the audit company. Concerning the effect of client importance on the 
quality of the audit, there are in the literature two in conflict hypotheses, the “eco-
nomic dependence hypothesis” and the “reputation protection hypothesis” (Rey-
nolds and Francis, 2001). The first is supporting that auditors will compromise their 
independence in order to safeguard their economically important clients and at the 
same time to maximize their revenue or even to avoid the possible losses of losing 
giant clients from competitors. The second hypothesis, from the other side, is based 
on the assumption that economically powerful clients pose bigger audit risk to an 
 [11] 
 
audit company, because large clients are usually companies of high profile and are 
more likely to be sued and targeted, and auditor’s loss of reputation and litigation 
cost associated with an audit scandal failure of those clients would be greater, this 
will force auditor companies to be more prudent toward them, in order to protect 
their reputation (Reynolds and Francis, 2001).  
In the USA the litigation risk of auditors is very high; however, it is likely that 
prior researchers have failed to prove that the reputation protection incentive out-
weighs the economic dependence incentive. This concept is in compliance with the 
evidence collected by Nelson (2002) reports of earnings management experienced 
by 253 auditors of Big-4. He also found that auditors required adjustments, more 
likely when the related clients were considered as not significant for the auditor’s 
firm portfolio.  
This hypothesis is consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981), who argues that an 
auditor will sacrifice his or her independence with respect to a client when the 
quasi-rent7 earned from that client account for a substantial part of the total quasi-
rents from the entire client portfolio of that auditor. 
In more details, this assumption is based on the conflict of interest in-
between the auditor and the audited company (Murcia and Borba, 2007). Consider-
ing the fact that the first offers services and the second is the one that hires and 
pays, in some cases, the outcome of the offered services can be influenced, and in 
particularly the audit report (opinion). Tarpley, Nelson, and Elliott (2002) address 
this matter by stating that the necessity of the market to protect and expand the 
businesses and safeguard client relationships, may lead to concessions in profes-
sional independence and objectivity. 
                                                     
7
 Quasi-rent is an economic term that describes a special type of returns to a company. It is not con-
sidered as a form of pure economic rent and it is not a permanent phenomenon.  
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Chambers and Payne (2008) also highlight this perception supporting that 
the financial dependence of auditors to their clients raise if the client amount of the 
account is significantly high for the relevant portion of the audit companies’ in-
comes. This fact increases the possibilities of disruption in the maintenance of pro-
fessional skepticism and the independence of the auditor. Coffee (2004) also high-
lighted as a reason for this disruption, the extravagant competition in this market, 
which may lead the audit companies in certain circumstances and conditions, to 
agree with the client, facing the possible high cost of lawsuit losses and the risk of 
public humiliation. Based on the above literature the second hypothesis would be 
the following. 
H2: The level of significance of a bank-client to the audit firm's portfolio is 
negatively associated with the quality of audits for the particular bank.   
3.3 Litigation Against Auditors  
As it was mentioned litigation risk against auditors is considered greater in 
the USA than in other countries. Especially after the huge scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom, which reveal that even major auditing companies such as Arthur Ander-
son can be involved in significant accounting scandals. Moreover, in the USA, the 
cost of liabilities for auditing companies depict a significant increase in the last dec-
ades, possibly due to the substantial increase in lawsuits against accountants and 
the damages associated with them. Particularly claims against auditors got in-
creased from 35% to 40% in the period 2005 till 2011 (Eigelbach 2011).8 Also, 
Thornton and Linville (2001) reported that many small audit firms end up without 
profits after paying their associated insurance premiums and their legal liability.  
                                                     
8
 In 2005, Deloitte agreed to pay $50 million to settle U.S. securities regulators’ claims over the com-
pany’s role as the auditor of bankrupt cable company Adelphia Communications Corp; KPMG agreed 
to pay $22 million to settle the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s charges that the account-
ing firm allowed Xerox to manipulate its accounting reports from 1997 through 2000; In 2007, Price-
waterhousCoopers agreed to pay $225 million to settle an investors’ class-action suit over an ac-
counting scandal at Tyco International Ltd. (Eigelbach 2011). 
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Ojo (2008) highlights that litigation risk might create stronger incentives for 
audit companies to be more careful with their practice and reduce the possibility of 
being permissive to client option, considering the negative consequences of their 
actions. Additionally, Ojo states that increasing litigation risk may lead the auditors 
to imply a defensible audit by interpreting rules mainly by the exercise of subjective 
judgment. 
Dye (1993), Heninger (2001) and more recently Talley (2006) pursued to re-
search the impact of the increasing litigation risk on the quality of the audit services 
provided by audit companies. They culminate in a more significant, over time, nega-
tive association with relevant corporate scandals. This question is especially impor-
tant, given that, for the audit company, litigation risk is not only a financial issue but 
also a reputation manner, impinging on their credibility. Thus, the third hypothesis 
to be tested empirically is: 
H3: The quality of the audit services in USA banks is positively associated with 
the increase in the risk of litigation against audit firms. 
3.4  Concentration of Audit Sector 
The market on audit companies’ supply is highly concentrated. The majority 
of audit engagements and approximately all audit fees concern only four audit 
firms, the so-called the Big-4 9, (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG).  
Since the 80s only a small number of large US firms have had the knowledge 
to perform audits for the vast majority of the banks. From that period the small 
number of those accounting firms, performing those audits, got decreased even 
                                                     
9 The Big-4 are the four biggest professional audit services companies with the greatest global net-
work. Except for audit services they also offer assurance, tax, consulting, advisory, corporate finance, 
and legal services. They are auditors of a vast majority of public companies as well as many private. 
Indicatively, as reported in the Wall Street Journal (2011-03-30), the Big-4 audits 99% of the com-
panies in the FTSE 100, and 96% of the companies in the FTSE 250 Index. 
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more and nowadays they are just four, the Big-4 which have tens of thousands of 
employees, offices located around the world and offer their services to more than 
one thousand companies and Banks. 
It is worthwhile to present some results from a research of the ESCP Europe 
Business School10 in 2010 concerning the concentration in audit industry. Particu-
larly the Big-4 handled 67% of the audit engagements and collected over 94% of the 
audit fees. Also, as discussed by Velte and Stiglbauer (2012), in the majority of the 
developed economies, the audit markets exhibit similar concentration. In depth, in 
Europe, the audit market of listed companies presents extremely high concentra-
tion levels as the average market share of the Big-4 is more than 90%. Only three 
countries, Greece, France, and Bulgaria could be characterised as not concentrated 
or moderately concentrated. In addition, when a combination of specific industries 
and largest companies are taken into account the market share can even rise close 
to 100%. Indicatively, in Sweden, PWC has a market share of 97% in turnover of the 
53 Information technology (IT) companies listed on the regulated market11.  
Despite being out of the field of research of this study, it is significant to re-
port the fact of the intense concentration in the audit industry, convert it into a sub-
ject of frequent debates about the existence of real competition. The Big Four ar-
gues that their dominance is by no means anticompetitive. It was achieved by in-
vestments in human resources and systems and by putting in place the requisite 
expertise and sector specialization which other, smaller auditing companies did not 
have. 
                                                     
10 ESCP Europe, Established in 1819 in Paris is the oldest European business school in the world with 
campuses in Paris, Turin, Berlin, London, Madrid, and Warsaw. It is also considered by numerous in-
ternational newspapers as one of the top business school word while. 
11 Using CR1/CR4/CR8 and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as concentration measures and calcu-
lating market shares in turnover of audited companies. 
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However, there is another side of the equation that argues about this. Ex-
emplary Mr. Andrew Hannington, the national chairman of PKF12 chartered ac-
countants and business advisers, who stated in an interview originally published in 
the July 2012 in the Journal of the Global Accounting Alliance that "Regulations to 
have favoured the process: with greater liabilities being imposed on directors and 
auditors, it has become just too easy to discharge one’s responsibility by appointing 
a Big-4 firm. That means there is not enough choice for the private sector, and the 
EU is saying so too,” insinuating that the Big-4 position of dominance is maintained 
by institutional preference, with stock markets, global banks and other institutions 
requiring that their major clients use only a Big-4 auditor.  
Regarding to the effect of the concentration on the audit quality, Ojo (2008) 
highlights that in spite of many elements supporting that concentration reinforces 
professionalism by reducing the risk of altered statements, other results depict that 
a higher number of audit companies would reduce the hazard of a powerful com-
pany establishing policies which promotes low-quality audit of financial statements. 
Kallapur (2010) also examined if the audit market concentration would undermine 
the quality of the audit. His research outcomes presented a negative association 
between the quality of accounting information and the increase in the concentra-
tion. 
In this study, it is assumed that the audit sector concentration jeopardizes 
the level of auditor skepticism, due to the potential lack of competition. Based on 
that, the next hypothesis under investigation is as follow. 
H4: There is a negative association between the quality of audits in USA 
banks and the concentration of the audit sector. 
                                                     
12 PKF (also known as Pannell Kerr Forster) is a global network of legally independent companies 
which offers accounting services and business consulting around the world. 
 [16] 
 
3.5 Internal Audit Effectiveness 
The coordination of internal and external audit activity is very important for 
both sides of view. Firstly, external auditors are important because they have the 
possibility to increase the accuracy and the quality of the financial statement audit. 
Whether for internal auditors this coordination is assured for them an addition of 
fundamental information in the risk control assessment (Dobroţeanu, L. & Dobro-
ţeanu C.L., 2002).  
As referred to ISA13 610 the work of internal auditors influenced the extent, 
the nature and the timing of audit performed by the external auditor. So, the extent 
to which the external auditors rely on the internal auditors’ work is defined by the 
audit planning decision which can have an important effect on audit quality (Felix et 
al., 2005 and 2001). However, in recent years, the activities of the internal audit 
have been enhanced so that the functions are not anymore limited based on 
strengthening and evaluating internal controls (Gramling et al., 2004, Cohen et al., 
2004).  Institute of Internal Auditors defines that the internal auditing is associated 
both with consulting activity and assurance, taking part in risk management and 
corporate governance. (IIA, 1999). 
ISA 610, 2009 also requires from the external auditors to evaluate a number 
factors such as technical competence, objectivity, communication and professional 
care, when they take into consideration the internal audit work in order to compre-
hend whether it is adequate for their audit. Also, USA standards demand external 
auditors to evaluate the objectivity, the competence and the work performed by 
internals when they make the reliance decisions (AICPA, 2008 (AU Section 322); 
PCAOB, 2007). However, USA standards recognize that the external auditors can use 
the internal auditors as assistants in order to understand and obtain controls, to 
perform substantive tests to test the controls.  
                                                     
13
ISA 610 (Revised 2013) International Auditing Standards, Using the Work of Internal Auditors. 
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Large bodies of researchers have focused on the reliance on external audi-
tor’s decision on the internal, with the majority of them examining the key factors 
of the objectivity as it is determined by the auditors, the extent of competence and 
the quality of work performed (Gramling, 2004). Other factors examined in the lit-
erature are the internal audit remuneration incentives (DeZoort, 2001), the level of 
coordination and interaction between external and internal audit (Felix, 2001), also 
the duty subjectivity (Glover, 2008; DeZoort, 2001), the internal audit arrangement 
(Glover, 2008) and the inherent risk (Glover, 2008; Felix, 2001). 
Considering the above, the external audit quality is positively connected 
with the internal audit quality. Responsible for maintaining high-quality internal au-
dit procedures are the audit committee. The audit committee not only plays an im-
portant role in assuring the quality of the corporate accountability and financial re-
porting (Carcello and Neal, 2000) but also oversight the internal audit procedures. 
The audit committee should have an in-depth understanding of the bank in order to 
provide effective internal audit oversight. It should also be diligent in elevating the 
importance of internal audit activities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision - 
The internal audit function in banks, June 2012) 
In this context, the effectiveness of audit committees is expected to be an 
implicit determinant of the quality of external auditing (Smith, 2006). On measuring 
audit committee effectiveness, the study focuses on the financial expertise within 
these committees. The BRC14 recommends that each committee of audit in a corpo-
ration should have at least one member with accounting and/or financial expertise, 
                                                     
14 BRC is the Blue Ribbon Committee which is responsible since 1999 for the Improving of the effec-
tiveness of audit committees of corporations. The BRC states that the audit committees should be 
consisted of at least three members, each of them should be independent and financially literate. The 
first term is defined in the report as having “no relationship to the corporation that may interfere 
with the exercise of their independence from management and the corporation” whether the second 
term is defined as “the ability to read and understand fundamental financial statements”. It is also 
highlighting that at least one member should have accounting or financial expertise, that is defined 
as past employment or professional in accounting or finance, or comparable experience including 
service as a corporate officer with financial oversight responsibility. 
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highlighting to committee members the importance of financial literacy and regula-
tion.  
Also, section 407 of the SOX adopts the above. Studies show that financial 
specialists as the members of the audit committee can play a crucial role in dealing 
with the intricacy of financial reporting (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993) and in partici-
pating in the elimination of financial restatements (Abbott et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, DeZoort in co-operation with Salterio (2001) conclude that au-
dit committee members with financial auditing knowledge are more likely to sup-
port the auditor in auditor-management conflicts and understand the judgments of 
the auditor than members without this knowledge. Audit committee members with 
financial knowledge can perform their supervisory roles in the financial reporting 
procedure more effectively and are more likely to detect material misstatements 
(Scarbrough et al., 1998 and Raghunandan et al., 2001). Additionally, Abbott 
(2004) finds a significantly negative relationship between an audit committee with 
at least one member with financial knowledge and the occurrence of the financial 
restatement. One year after Krishnan (2005) presents evidence that audit commit-
tee with financial expert members is less likely to face internal and external prob-
lems as far as the audit procedure. Therefore, the following directional prediction 
could be created. 
H5: Greater audit committee financial expertise influences positively the au-
dit quality of Banks. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
In spite of the relevance of the rational inherent in the use of discretionary 
accruals, it would be a negligence not to clarify some methodological limitations 
which are deriving from the relevant literature review. Firstly, discretion by a man-
ager, as far as the production of information, can be considered also positive if they 
are contributing in the communication of an aggregation of private information of 
the company (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan and Wolf, 2009; Kallapur, Sankaragu-
ruswamy, and Zang, 2010). Secondly, abnormal accruals may be also influenced by 
some other non-discretionary variables (Bernard and Skinner, 1996). Finally, the na-
ture of accruals itself, assume that a consecutive, inverse or direct association with 
different variable it is untenable (Gu, Lee & Rosett, 2005). 
Considering these limitations and in order to address them, the calculation 
of the proxy will include the first difference in the next from the previous period, in 
absolute value. Thus, with this way we can focus on the process of accruals recogni-
tion, which changes from one period to another, rather than the discretionary ac-
crual accepted by the audit. This method is in compliance with different studies that 
debate with the persistence of accruals as the best parameter to evaluate the reli-
ability of the disclosure (Chambers and Payne, 2008).  
Furthermore, this divergence is adjusted by multiplying it by (-1) to depict 
that, the greater the bias, the worse the result and the quality of the audit will be. 
Kallapur (2010) was the inspirer of this equation in order to calculate the proxy of 
audit quality; however, he did not use the concept of the first difference. 
 
AQi , t =  │DACi ,t − DAC i,t-1 │* (-1) (1) 
 
Where: 
 AQi, t: The audit quality which is performed in the bank i in the year t. 
  DACi,t : Discretionary accruals as defined by the model (2) of LLP 
 [20] 
 
The variable DAC, is identified by discretion practice in accordance to the 
LLP, which, as already referred, is the parameter with the greatest number of stud-
ies on the method of earnings management in banks and are provided as the allow-
ances of the largest accruals in the banking industry playing a crucial role in deci-
sions for any potential accounting manipulations, as explained by Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo and Mathieu (2003). The model described below and used to identify the dis-
cretion is a modified version of the model used by Ahmed et al. (1999) and Ananda-
rajan et al. (2003, 2007) : 
 Where: 
 
                                                     
15 The Tier 1 ratio is a capital ratio that shows the amount of a bank's main equity capital to its ag-
gregate risk-weighted assets (RWA). The RWA are all the assets that belong to the bank weighted 
by the risk of credit which is determined by the regulator which is usually a country's central bank. 
The majority of central banks follow the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision rules in calculating 
the formulae for the asset risk weights. Assets such as the cash  have 0% of risk, while loans have a 
risk weight of 100%. 
LLPi,t=α0 +α1ΔLOANi,t +α2NPLi,t-1+α3ΔNPLi,t+α4 LCOi,t + α5LLAi,t-1+a6INTR i,t+α7GDPRt 
+a8TIER1i,t+a9COMMLOANi,t +a10CONSLOAN i,t+a11MORTLOAN i,t+εi,t 
(2) 
LLPit: Loan loss provision of the bank i in 
year t. 
ΔLOANi,t: Changes  in the total out-
standing  loans of banks i from  year t-1 to 
t. 
NPLi,t-1: Nonperforming loans  of the banks 
i  in  year t-1. 
ΔNPLi,t: Changes  in the value of non-
performing loans  of the bank i from  year 
t-1 to t. 
LCOi,t: Net loan write-offs of the bank i in   
year t. 
LLAi,t-1: Losses of loan allowance of bank i 
in  year t-1. 
INTRi,t: Average rate of interest on  the 
loans in  year t  of  the bank i. 
 
TIER1t: Tier 1
15 ratio f of the bank i in year 
t. 
GDPRt: Gross Domestic Product rate in 
USA in basic prices, in year t. 
COMMLOANSi,t: The amount of  commer-
cial loans of the bank i in  year t. 
CONSLOANS i,t : The amount of  consumer 
loans, of the bank i in  year t. 
MORTLOANSi,t:  The amount of  real es-
tate loans of the bank i in  year t; 
ε i ,t: The error term, corresponding to the 
discretionary accruals of LLPi,t of bank i in  
year t. 
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The implementation of the aforementioned model does not actually aim to 
test any of the searching hypotheses. As we have already referred it contributes to 
the specification of the audit quality which will be used in the next basic model in 
order to search our hypothesis. However, it is worthwhile to explain it more thor-
oughly.   
This model is based on Engel and Beaver (1996), Kross and Kim (1998), 
Krishnan, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo (2010), and Beck and Narayanmoorthy (2013). 
The purpose of it is to separate LLP into discretionary and nondiscretionary compo-
nents including nonperforming assets, size, and macroeconomic variables. Discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary accruals of LLP have predictably repeated characteris-
tics. For example, when directors of banks use their discretion to increase/ decrease 
earnings in a year, the future earnings will be lower/higher by an amount similar to 
the real discretion. Also, as the LLP is a component of earnings, if the managers de-
cide to use their discretion to increase/decrease the LLP in the current year then the 
LLP will be lower/higher by an equal amount in the future years.  
The control variables which we have used following to the model of Pérez et 
al. (2008) is the natural logarithm of total assets as a determinant of the size of the 
bank. However, we should consider that the LLP and the banks’ size did not have a 
continuously and immediate relationship, we expect that large banks will result in 
greater credit portfolio diversification in compare to smaller. Under these circum-
stances, there is the possibility of the banks allocating higher LLPs to depict safety 
and confidence to the market. The GDP is used as another control variable and it is 
the annual growth rate of the USA gross domestic product. This index can effec-
tively capture the impact on macroeconomic conditions (business cycle) on LLP 
(Pérez et al. 2008). Similar to Ahmed et al. (1999) and Anandarajan et al. (2003, 
2007), we have included in our model  a third control variable, the Tier 1 ratio, pre-
senting  the minimum required regulatory capital before loan loss reserves and con-
tributing in the examination of the use of LLP  for the capital management.  
 [22] 
 
We have also included the variety of loan categories, particularly the com-
mercial (COMMLOAN), the consumer (CONSLOAN), and a variable representing the 
mortgage loans (MORTLOAN). We have included them as a percentage of the total 
outstanding loans of each bank. 
In addition, we have followed the practice of Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo 
(2010), where the variables LLP, ∆LOAN, NPL, ∆NPL, LCO and LLA of each bank that 
is included in our model, are normalized by the banks aggregate assets of each 
bank, so that the risk of the residual heteroscedasticity will be eliminated in the cal-
culation of the model.  
The next step, after the identification of the audit quality proxy, is to test the 
hypothesis under investigation. The model which we have used to test the hypothe-
ses of section 3 is described below: 
AQi,t = α0 + α1 + α2 BIG4 + α3 CIMi,t + α4  ACMi,t + α5  HHIt,t-1 + a6  
LITt,t  + α7 ROAAi,t + α8CAPRi,t+ α9LISi,t +εi,t 
(
(3) 
 
Where: 
AQi,t : Is the quality of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it was measured by the 
model 1&2; 
BIG4i, t : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 
0, otherwise. 
CIMi,t: Shows the significance of the bank i for the audit company’s portfolio at year t, 
determined based on the total assets of the bank i. 
ACMi,t: The effectiveness of audit committee of the bank i in year t.  
HHIt: It is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which reflects the degree of concentration 
of audit services supply in the USA banking sector at the year t, as it was measured by 
the AUDIT ANALYTICS. 
LIT i, t: Litigation against auditor company  which audit bank i at period t,  
ROAA i, t: The return on average assets ratio i, t. 
CAPR i, t:  The Capital ratio of the bank i in period t.  
LIS i, t:  Depict whether the bank i is listing on the stock exchange - assumed as 1 for 
listed; 0, otherwise. 
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The AQ dependent variable of the above equation is the indicator of audit 
quality proxy performed in the bank i in period t which is identified by the discre-
tionary accrual that corresponds to the error term of the equation 2 and is calcu-
lated by the model 1. The Big-4 variable is a dummy depicting whether the bank i is 
audited by one of the Big-4 audit companies at the year t or not. Based on our initial 
hypothesis this variable should be positively correlated to the audit quality. 
The variable for the audit committee effectiveness depends on whether the 
audit committee of each bank includes any member with financial educational or 
experiential background. The Audit committee of banks with one financial expertise 
are characterized as MIDDLE effectiveness and of two as HIGH whether the audit 
committees without any financial expertise are characterized as LOW effectiveness. 
The next variable of our model is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index16, also 
known as Herfindahl index. This is an indicator for the measurement of the concen-
tration in a variety of contexts. It is commonly used by the Federal Reserve and the 
Department of Justice as it achieves a high extent of visibility and it is also applica-
ble to the analysis of the competitive effects of acquisitions and mergers. In our 
analysis, we have obtained the information for the HHI of audit industry from the 
reports of GAO.  
For the delineation of the litigation risk, we have used the annual number of 
litigation against each audit company concerning possible lawlessness in the bank-
ing industry.  These data were obtained from AUDIT ANALYTICS. 
As far as the rest three variables, the CAPR, the ROAA and the dummy LIS 
variable are used to add empirical evidence of the financial condition of each bank 
in the test.  
                                                     
16 
The HHI index takes into consideration the size distribution of the firms in a particular industry. 
When an Industry is constituted by a large number of firms the HHI index is approximately equal to 
zero, whether reaches the 10,000 points if a sector is controlled by only one firm. The HHI increases in 
two cases. Firstly when the number of companies in the industry reduces or secondly, when the dis-
parity between the sizes of those firms increase, as it is clarified by the US Department of Justice. 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
For the empirical tests, we have used data obtain from for yearly financial in-
formation reports of  312 commercial and multiple-service financial institution from 
2000 to 2015, available on the BANSCOPE Database . It table 1 we provide a de-
scriptive analytics summary of the variables of the total sample used to test both 
the model (1) and the model (3). 
Τable 1 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ID 4680 156.5 90.0758 1 312 
year 4680 2008 4.320955 2001 2015 
NPL 4680 0.013954 0.0236312 0 0.3680286 
LLP 4680 0.0043898 0.0078988 -0.0166669 0.1036412 
TIER1 4680 14.22261 7.027333 6.09 62.31 
ROAA 4680 0.9017511 1.010726 -6.334 6.342 
INT 4680 3.725397 1.052192 1.153 9.333 
LCO 4680 -0.000304 0.0006855 -0.0099364 -1.60E-07 
CIM 4680 4.69E+07 2.05E+08 30192 1.88E+09 
COMMLOAN 4670 0.1798996 0.1550172 0 1.008609 
CONSLOAN 4670 0.087818 0.1423312 0 1.114884 
MORTLOAN 4680 0.6679826 0.3150493 0 1.037228 
CPR 4680 15.72659 6.764837 8.37 63.1 
LLA 4680 0.0100963 0.006567 0.000014 0.0843676 
GDPrate 4680 0.0180667 0.015487 -0.028 0.038 
BIG4 4680 0.2423077 0.4285253 0 1 
LIT 4680 0.017094 0.2171492 0 5 
ACM 4617 1.017977 0.2478276 0 2 
HHI 4680 2379.667 145.1406 1958 2540 
NPLt1 4368 0.0140062 0.0237748 0 0.3680286 
DLOAN 4368 0.0007387 0.0537948 -0.4937218 0.5779223 
LLAt1 4368 0.0102033 0.0066944 0.0000985 0.0843676 
DNPL 4368 0.0005287 0.0113281 -0.1262334 0.1118781 
LIS 4700 0.1819149 0.3858154 0 1 
DAC 4358 -3.99E-12 0.0207623 -0.2892101 0.2199226 
AQ 4039 -0.0002373 0.0343308 -0.3036757 0.5091326 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of total sample variables. The sample includes 312 USA banks with updated financial 
data at the Bankscope Database over the period 2000-2015. ID: Banks ID; YEAR: Period over 2000-2015; LLP: Loan 
loss provision ΔLOAN: Changes in the total outstanding loans; NPL: Nonperforming loans; ΔNPL: Changes in the 
value of non-performing loans from year t-1 to t ; LCO: Net loan write-offs LLA: Losses of loan allowance; INTR: 
Average rate of interest on the loans TIER1: Tier 1 ratio f of the bank; GDP: Gross Domestic Product rate in USA in 
basic prices, in year t; COMMLOANS: The amount of commercial loans; CONSLOANS: The amount of consumer loans; 
MORTLOANS:  The amount of  real estate loans; AQ : The quality of the audit performed in the bank i in year t, 
measured by the model 1&2; BIG4 : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 0, 
otherwise; CIM: Shows the significance of the bank i for the audit company’s portfolio at year t, determined based on 
the total assets of the bank i; ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee; HHI: It is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
which reflects the degree of concentration of audit services supply in the USA banking sector at the year t, as it was 
measured by the AUDIT ANALYTICS; LIT: Litigation against auditor company; ROAA: The return on average assets 
ratio; CAPR:  The Capital ratio rate.  LIS:  Depict whether the bank i is listing on the stock exchange - assumed as 1 for 
listed; 0, otherwise; DAC: Discretionary accruals of model 2  
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Next, at table 1 we provide the result from the model (2) which is the identi-
fication of discretion in the process of earning management and especially the LLP 
by the banks, for the two periods under investigation and for the total period.  The 
estimation of the model (2) contributes in calculating the discretionary accruals, or 
in other words the error term, which is the basis for the model (3) and for the iden-
tification of audit quality proxy.  
Table 2 
  (-1) (-2) (-3) 
  LLP LLP LLP    
DLOAN 0.0019 -0.0134*** -0.00577**  
  (-0.00193) (-0.00351) (-0.00215) 
NPLt1 -0.0350* 0.0507*** 0.0347*** 
  (-0.0138) (-0.0122) (-0.00984) 
DNPL 0.132** 0.164*** 0.160*** 
  (-0.0482) (-0.0233) (-0.0223) 
LLAt1 0.624*** 0.399*** 0.485*** 
  (-0.0731) (-0.0527) (-0.0443) 
LCO 0.640*** 1.687*** 0.637*** 
  (-0.159) (-0.298) (-0.148) 
GDPrate -0.158*** -0.219*** -0.340*** 
  (-0.0349) (-0.0185) -0.0471 
TIER1 0.000134*** -0.000102*** 0.00000218 
  (-0.0000309) (-0.0000257) (-0.0000218) 
INT 0.000488** 0.000629** 0.000429**  
  (-0.000171) (-0.000242) (-0.000161) 
CONSLOAN -0.000118 0.00139 0.000584 
  (-0.000764) (-0.00131) (-0.000833) 
COMMLOAN 0.000986 0.00204+ 0.00152+   
  (-0.000862) (-0.00121) (-0.000808) 
MORTLOAN -0.000199 0.000833 0.000258 
  (-0.000496) (-0.000634) (-0.00043) 
_cons -0.00224 0.00147 0.00334* 
  (-0.00138) (-0.00115) (-0.00139) 
N 1869 2489 4358 
R-sq 41.70% 46.50% 45.90% 
adj.R-sq 41.20% 46.10% 45.60% 
F 9.924 62.19 50.63 
Table 2: Regression results of model 1 . T-statistics are in the parentheses, denote + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001 significance level. All the specifications of the model include the year dummies in order to 
capture any unobserved impacts; LLP: Loan loss provision; ΔLOAN: Changes in the total outstanding loans; 
NPL: Nonperforming loans; ΔNPL: Changes in the value of non-performing loans from year t-1 to t; LCO: Net 
loan write-offs; LLA: Losses of loan allowance; INTR: Average rate of interest on the loans; TIER1: Tier 1 ratio f 
of the bank.GDP: Gross Domestic Product rate in the USA in basic prices, in year t. COMMLOANS: The amount 
of commercial loans; CONSLOANS: The amount of consumer loans; MORTLOANS:  The amount of real estate 
loans. 
LLP (1)= 1st SUB-SAMPLE LLP (2)= 2nd PERIOD SAMPLE LLP (3)= FULL SAMPLE 
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In order to provide robust coefficients and standard errors, our cross-section 
data models have been estimated with the OLS regression, so even in the case of 
heteroscedasticity or contemporaneous correlations in the errors term of the mod-
els, our results will be robust. Also, we have winsorized17 all variable at 1% In order 
to reduce the extreme values in our data and to eliminate the possible impact of 
spurious outliers. 
It is important also to refer that for both models we have implied Pearson 
test (table 4 appendix) .Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient test is a 
measure of the linear dependence between our continuous variables.  We use it in 
order to measure the strength and direction of the association that exists between 
them. The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than or equal 
to 1. Correlations equal to 1 or −1 correspond to data points lying exactly on the line 
whether the value of 0 in the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates no relation-
ship between the two variables. 
In continuation, through the discretionary accruals outsourcing from model 
(2), we have calculated equation (1) and identify the AQ variable, the dependent 
variable of the main model (3), which we have test bellow. After a research we con-
ducted in different regression approaches we selected the best fitted and executed 
in model 3, the OLS.  
After a research that we have conducted in different regression approaches 
we selected the best fitted and executed it in model (3). The results are presented 
in table 2. Unfortunately, they raise a lot of concerns for our basic hypothesis and 
its acceptance or rejection.  
                                                     
17 “A method of averaging that initially replaces the smallest and largest values with the observa-
tions closest to them. After replacing the values, a simple arithmetic averaging formula is used to 
calculate the winsorized mean.”Definition from “An introduction to Business Research Methods” Sue 
Greener , Dr. Sue Greener , Dr. Joe Martelli. 
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Table 3 
 
expect (-1) (-2) (-3) 
 
 AQ AQ AQ 
BIG4 (+) -0.000451 -0.000381 -0.000319 
 
 (-0.00179) (-0.00357) (-0.00158) 
CIM (-) -0.000193 0.000288 -0.0000212 
 
 (-0.000383) (-0.000642) (-0.000328) 
LIT (+) 0.000507 0.000174 0.00044 
 
 (-0.000975) (-0.00422) (-0.00096) 
ACM (+) -0.00331 -0.00387 -0.00347+ 
 
 (-0.00216) (-0.00401) (-0.00189) 
HHI (-) 0.00000971 0.0000146 0.0000158 
 
 (-0.0000277) (-0.0000874) (-0.0000291) 
LIS (.) 0.000462 0.0000297 0.000282 
 
 (-0.00134) (-0.00227) (-0.00116) 
ROAA (.) 0.000706 0.00102 0.000803 
 
 (-0.000731) (-0.00136) (-0.000647) 
CΑPR (.) -0.0000841 -0.0000818 -0.0000874 
 
 (-0.000125) (-0.000219) (-0.000116) 
 
 
   _cons  -0.0162 -0.0357 -0.0339 
 
 (-0.0676) (-0.207) (-0.0711) 
N  2463 1525 3988 
R-sq  0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
adj.R-sq  -0.3% -0.3% -0.2% 
F  0.603 0.552 0.754 
Table 3 : Regression results of model 1 . T-statistics are in the parentheses, denote + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 significance level. All the specifications of the model include the year 
dummies in order to capture any unobserved impacts; AQ : Is the quality of the audit in the bank i in 
the year t, as it was measured by the model 1&2; BIG4 : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit 
the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 0, otherwise; CIM: importance of calculated according to the to-
tal assets. ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee HHI: Reflects the degree of concentration cal-
culated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; LIT: Litigation against auditor company .ROAA: The re-
turn on average assets ratio. CAPR: the Capital ratio; LIS: Is the quality y of the audit in the bank i in 
the year t, as it was measured by the model 1&2 
ΑQ (1)= 1st SUB-SAMPLE ΑQ (2)= 2nd PERIOD SAMPLE ΑQ (3)= FULL SAMPLE 
 
Firstly, comparing the results of Table 3 with the assumptions of the initial 
hypotheses, we notice that there isn’t any statistically significant association be-
tween audit quality and any of the variables, indicating whether the bank is audited 
from one of the Big-4 or nonBig-4in the banking sector. So, the hypothesis H1, which 
supports a positive relationship between these two variables, is empirically not con-
firmed. 
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 The hypothesis H1 was based in the perspective that Big-4 companies can 
provide a broader understanding of accounting policies and trends, have a high abil-
ity to identify problems and can assess evidence in the statements in a compara-
tively more integrated manner. The probable reason for this outcome may be the 
fact that the majority of banks are audited by one of the Big-4 and thus it is quanti-
tatively impossible the identification of any significant difference in comparison to 
the audits conducted by nonBig-4 companies. 
As far as the importance of a client, particularly a bank, (CIM) for the audit 
firm portfolio the initial assumption of a negative association with audit quality is 
not empirically confirmed neither for the two sub-samples considered by the peri-
ods before of the financial crisis and after, nor the total sample.  
Our hypothesis H2 supported that the greater the financial size of the bank 
audited, the greater the exposure of the audit company to opportunistic pitfalls by 
management as the auditors are more likely to compromise with the requirements 
of their most important and powerful clients. From the results of table 2, we can 
conclude that our empirical testing result did not support the premise of our hy-
pothesis.  A possible explanation for that could be found to the great market share 
of Big-4. In the USA banking industry, almost all big banks are audited from one of 
the Big4.  Due to the big amount of clients that each audit company serves it is less 
likely to be highly dependent on one particular client, regardless the size of the cli-
ent.  
The empirical tests conducted on the LR variable, as we already mentioned, 
reveal the number of litigations against each audit company for each year and con-
cern only litigation cases that appertain to the banking sector. The relationship be-
tween audit quality and litigation risk is not empirically proved neither at the sub-
samples nor to the full sample, so is the hypothesis H3 also not confirmed.   
This outcome is possibly explained by the fact that the litigation cases 
against audit firms, concerning their services in financial institutions, during the last 
fifteen years in the USA market are very few. As we can see in table 4 only Ernest 
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and Young has faced a quite significant number of litigations; however due to the 
long time period we investigate is still considered as negligible. Also, it is worth 
mentioning that during the second sub-period the number of litigations is higher, 
indicating that financial crisis led to greater enforcement of regulatory controls and 
stricter operation rules, especially in the banking industry. This indirectly could lead 
to the enhancement of the audit quality of firms since the risk of punishment has 
arisen.    
Table 4 
Case 
ID Audit Company 
Auditor 
Key Named 
Case 
Began 
29697 Deloitte & Touche LLP 3 Defendant (Lead) 6/4/2015 
24309 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP 1 
Related Non-
Party 5/3/2010 
24309 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP 1 
Related Non-
Party 5/3/2010 
24291 Ernst & Young Ltd Bermuda 2 Defendant 10/12/2009 
24291 Ernst & Young Ltd Bermuda 2 Defendant 10/12/2009 
24291 Ernst & Young Ltd Bahamas 2 Defendant 10/12/2009 
24291 Ernst & Young Ltd Bahamas 2 Defendant 10/12/2009 
24879 Ernst and Young LLP 2 Defendant 3/2/2009 
9051 Ernst & Young LLP 2 
Related Non-
Party 12/3/2007 
9051 Deloitte & Touche LLP 3 
Related Non-
Party 12/3/2007 
3310 Ernst & Young LLP 2 Plaintiff (Lead) 25/9/2003 
1427 Ernst & Young LLP 2 Defendant (Lead) 1/11/2002 
12877 BDO Seidman LLP 7 Defendant (Lead) 23/4/2008 
12375 BDO Seidman LLP 7 Defendant 9/5/2009 
Table 4: Litigations against audit companies concerning the banking industry for 2000-2015, obtained 
from AUDIT ANALYTICS. 
 
 
Regarding the influence of the concentration of the audit sector to the audit 
quality, the empirical tests don’t show any statistically significant association be-
tween the variables HHI and AQ, so the prediction of H4 is not confirmed. This result 
may reflect, in a way, the research by Ojo (2008) focusing on the duality effect of 
market concentration. Ojo supported that market concentration could have two 
distinct possible influences. The first influence states that high concentration pro-
motes specialization, eliminating the risk of misleading statements. The second ef-
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fect reveals that higher competition, which means lower concentration, can reduce 
the risk of a great audit firm to become dominant and establish policies and meth-
ods encouraging statements of low quality. According to the above and considering 
that the HHI index, according to the report of GAO, didn’t provide any significant 
changes during the period, we can’t conclude to the concentration being a worthy 
determinant of audit quality. 
Additionally, it is really interesting to state another point of view as far as 
the concentration in the audit industry and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The 
state that audit market is highly concentrated and there are barriers to entry result-
ing to the Big-4 f large firms to gain market power is not actually supported by the 
HHI index. According to an official report of PWC investigating the market of supply-
ing audit services to large companies, the HHI index is not a helpful indicator of 
competitiveness intensity in a market such as the audit. Especially, if it is applied to 
this market it demonstrates that the market is more moderately concentrated 
rather than highly. This is also corroborated by the rate of the HHI index which we 
have obtained from Audit Analytics ranging from 1958 to 246018. 
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The “U.S. Department of Justice” and “Federal Trade Commission” classify markets with a number 
of HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 points as moderately concentrated, whether markets with an HHI 
index over 2,500 points as highly concentrated. 
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6. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The accuracy of the financial statements is a vital prerequisite for the 
proper functioning of the banking sector. Especially in a situation where deposi-
tors are suspicious, the above statement becomes of even higher importance, 
moreover when taking into consideration that banks are subject to numerous of 
risks, one of the most important is the systemic risk or most commonly state as 
the risk of “bank run”. For that matter, the hard work of independent auditors, 
assigned to enforce the rules and ensure the reliability and the credibility of the 
financial disclosure process and the accounting reports, is an aspect that might 
contribute and create an ambiance of trust among stakeholders. The report pre-
pared by the auditors has more importance considering that the preparation of 
financial statements highly incorporates subjective factors of professional judg-
ment, leaving space for possible opportunistic behavior by hiding an occasionally 
unsatisfactory financial situation.  
Taking these into account and in combination with the lack of empirical evi-
dence on the market of audit services supply in the financial institution industry, and 
particularly in the USA market, this study ventured to reveal and identify a concise fig-
ure of a very controversial issue, the audit quality, into a highly significant industry, the 
banking. Having as a braking point the beginning of the financial crisis, we divided our 
research in order to observe how the financial crisis background has influenced the 
audit quality determinants and whether our initial hypothesis was confirmed or they 
were adjusted to each period and to the total period. 
Using the discretionary accruals defined by the LLP model and by calculating 
the model (1) we identified the audit quality. The variable of audit quality results was 
used as the dependent variable in the model (3). However, the final result which we 
obtained from model (3) did not depict any statistically significant associations within a 
95%, 99% and 99.9% confidence interval (as the p-values are higher from 0.05, 0.01 
and 0.001).  
Taking into consideration that model (3) has already been used to identify audit 
quality determinants in different samples we can derive two significant conclusions 
from our research. Firstly, model (1) and model (2) are not a sufficient and appropriate 
way for identifying audit quality of the USA banks. Secondly, audit quality of USA banks 
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cannot be defined through the model (3). These assumptions actually, confirm the 
main limitation of this dissertation, that audit quality, is not an externally observable 
factor, but is actually extremely complicated and it has to be thoroughly researched by 
an even greater variety of different proxies. 
Thus, we would suggest further study and research in order to control the va-
lidity of the models and the research hypotheses in different settings and proxies. We 
would also recommend the further research for explanatory variables that would best-
fit audit quality in the banking market and specifically in the USA banking industry 
since it is possible to illustrate a unique behavior.  
Concluding, this study could contribute to further discussion and debates con-
cerning the audit quality and how it can be determined.  This issue is extremely im-
portant and can play a vital role and lead to an economy dominated by of transparency 
and solidity and can protect the global financial system for a crisis such as the last one 
of 2008, including the audit contribution as a complementary and auxiliary supervisor.  
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7. Appendix  
Table 5 
 
 Table 5: LLP: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is a measure of the linear dependence between our continuous variables of model 1.  We use it in order to measure the strength 
and direction of the association that exists between them. The Pearson correlation generates a coefficient which is referred as Pearson correlation coefficient and is commonly represented as r. A 
Pearson's correlation draws a line that tries to best fit the data of the variables.  In this case the Pearson correlation coefficient. r. indicates how far away all data points are from the line of best 
fit. The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than or equal to 1. Correlations equal to 1 or −1 correspond to data points lying exactly on the line. A value of 0 in the Pearson 
correlation coefficient indicates no relationship between the two variables; LLP: Loan loss provision; ΔLOAN: Changes in the total outstanding loans; NPL: Nonperforming loans; ΔNPL: Changes in 
the value of non-performing loans from year t-1 to t; LCO: Net loan write-offs; LLA: Losses of loan allowance; INTR: Average rate of interest on the loans; TIER1: Tier 1 ratio f of the bank.GDP: 
Gross Domestic Product rate in USA in basic prices, in year t. COMMLOANS: The amount of commercial loans; CONSLOANS: The amount of consumer loans; MORTLOANS:  The amount of real 
estate loans. 
  LLP DLOAN NPLt1 DNPL LLAt1 LCO GDPrate TIER1 INT CONSLOAN COMMLOAN MORTLOAN 
LLP 1.000 
          
  
DLOAN   -0.176 1.000 
         
  
NPLt1     0.225 -0.118 1.000 
        
  
DNPL     0.294 -0.017 -0.206 1.000 
       
  
LLAt1     0.449 -0.110 0.420 -0.138 1.000 
      
  
LCO    0.084 -0.020 -0.024 0.001 0.114 1.000 
     
  
GDPrate   -0.363 0.200 -0.040 -0.343 -0.027 -0.015 1.000 
    
  
TIER1    -0.106 -0.046 0.099 -0.068 -0.148 -0.314 0.044 1.000 
   
  
INT     0.224 -0.039 0.177 -0.021 0.365 -0.125 0.032 -0.009 1.000 
  
  
CONSLOAN    0.021 -0.003 0.013 0.001 0.029 0.031 0.010 -0.034 0.037 1.000 
 
  
COMMLOAN     0.021 -0.010 0.048 0.004 -0.016 0.013 -0.014 -0.014 0.000 0.015 1.000   
MORTLOAN -0.029 0.010 -0.041 -0.013 -0.011 -0.055 0.005 0.056 -0.031 -0.494 -0.578 1.000 
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Table 5: LLP: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is a measure of the linear dependence between our continuous variables of model 1.  We use it in order to measure the strength 
and direction of the association that exists between them. The Pearson correlation generates a coefficient which is referred as Pearson correlation coefficient and is commonly represented as 
r. A Pearson's correlation draws a line that tries to best fit the data of the variables.  In this case the Pearson correlation coefficient. r. indicates how far away all data points are from the line 
of best fit. The absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is less than or equal to 1. Correlations equal to 1 or −1 correspond to data points lying exactly on the line. A value of 0 in 
the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates no relationship between the two variables. AQ: The quality of the audit performed in the bank i in period t. measured by the model 1&2. BIG4 : 
Dummy 1 if the auditor is a member of the Big 4; 0. otherwise. CIM: importance of calculated according to the total assets. ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee HHIt: Reflects the de-
gree of concentration calculated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. LIT: Litigation against auditor company .ROAA: The return on average assets ratio. CAPR:  The Capital ratio.  LIS:  Listing 
on the stock exchange - assumed as 1 for the listed. 0 for unlisted and 2 for delist
Table 6 
  AQ BIG4 LAS LIT ACM HHI LIS ROAA       CPR 
AQ 1.000 
       
  
BIG4 -0.002 1.000 
      
  
CIM 0.007 0.232 1.000 
     
  
LIT 0.005 0.112 0.111 1.000 
    
  
ACM -0.024 -0.013 -0.023 -0.018 1.000 
   
  
HHI -0.002 -0.074 0.122 0.000 0.021 1.000 
  
  
LIS 0.003 0.268 0.148 0.133 0.013 0.000 1.000 
 
  
ROAA 0.010 -0.064 0.033 -0.062 0.014 -0.139 -0.036 1.000   
CPR -0.015 -0.018 -0.245 -0.012 0.005 0.095 -0.125 0.107 1.000 
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Table 7(Model 1 Sub-sample 2000-2007) 
Table 7: Regression of model 1 for the sub sample from 2000-2007 . Table 8: Regression of model 1 for the sub sample from 
20008-2015 ; LLP: Loan loss provision; ΔLOAN: Changes in the total outstanding loans; NPL: Nonperforming loans; ΔNPL: 
Changes in the value of non-performing loans from year t-1 to t; LCO: Net loan write-offs; LLA: Losses of loan allowance; 
INTR: Average rate of interest on the loans; TIER1: Tier 1 ratio f of the bank.GDP: Gross Domestic Product rate in USA in 
basic prices, in year t. COMMLOANS: The amount of commercial loans; CONSLOANS: The amount of consumer loans; MORT-
LOANS:  The amount of real estate loans. 
Table 8 (Model 1 Sub-sample 2008-2015)
 LLP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DLOAN 0.001903 0.0019273 0.99 0.324 -0.0018769 0.005683 
NPLt1 -0.0350119 0.0137731 -2.54 0.011 -0.0620243 -0.0079995 
DNPL 0.1319839 0.0481663 2.74 0.006 0.037518 0.2264498 
LLAt1 0.6236496 0.0731026 8.53 0.000 0.4802775 0.7670217 
LCO 0.6401617 0.1589536 4.03 0.000 0.3284148 0.9519086 
GDPrate -0.1578542 0.0348514 -4.53 0.000 -0.2262063 -0.0895022 
TIER1 0.000134 0.0000309 4.34 0.000 0.0000734 0.0001946 
INT 0.0004885 0.0001712 2.85 0.004 0.0001527 0.0008242 
CONSLOAN -0.0001179 0.0007638 -0.15 0.877 -0.001616 0.0013801 
COMMLOAN 0.0009857 0.0008616 1.14 0.253 -0.0007041 0.0026755 
MORTLOAN -0.0001985 0.0004961 -0.4 0.689 -0.0011715 0.0007744 
_cons -0.0022432 0.001378 -1.63 0.103 0.0049435 0.004567 
Number of obs= 1869 
    
  
F( 15.  1853)= 9.92 
    
  
Prob > F= 0.000 
    
  
R-squared= 0.4167 
    
  
Root MSE= 0.00397       
LLP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DLOAN -0.0133701 0.0035131 -3.81 0.000 -0.020259 -0.0064811 
NPLt1 0.0507094 0.0122056 4.15 0.000 0.0267752 0.0746436 
DNPL 0.1637265 0.0233278 7.02 0.000 0.1179825 0.2094705 
LLAt1 0.398689 0.0527416 7.56 0.000 0.2952668 0.5021112 
LCO 1.686721 0.2978505 5.66 0.000 1.102659 2.270783 
GDPrate -0.218689 0.0184687 -11.84 0.000 -0.2549048 -0.1824732 
TIER1 -0.0001021 0.0000257 -3.98 0.000 -0.0001524 -0.0000518 
INT 0.0006293 0.0002418 2.6 0.009 0.0001551 0.0011034 
CONSLOAN 0.0013879 0.001311 1.06 0.290 -0.0011828 0.0039586 
COMMLOAN 0.0020384 0.0012073 1.69 0.091 -0.0003289 0.0044058 
MORTLOAN 0.0008328 0.0006343 1.31 0.189 -0.0004109 0.0020765 
_cons 0.014749 0.0011534 1.28 0.201 -0.007869 0.0037367 
Number 2489 
    
  
F( 17.  2471) 62.19 
    
  
Prob > F= 0.000 
    
  
R-squared= 0.4652 
    
  
Root MSE= 0.00675           
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  Table 9 (Model 1 Full-Sample 2000-2015) 
LLP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DLOAN -0.0057682 0.0021529 -2.68 0.000 -0.0099889 -0.0015474 
NPLt1 0.034705 0.0098399 3.53 0.000 0.0154138 0.0539962 
DNPL 0.1600417 0.0223148 7.17 0.000 0.1162933 0.20379 
LLAt1 0.4846912 0.0442871 10.94 0.000 0.3978659 0.5715165 
LCO 0.6370503 0.1484751 4.29 0.000 0.3459632 0.9281375 
GDPrate -0.3399135 0.0471181 -7.21 0.000 -0.4322891 -0.2475379 
TIER1 2.18E-06 0.0000218 0.1 0.920 -0.0000406 0.0000449 
INT 0.0004288 0.0001614 2.66 0.008 0.0001123 0.0007453 
CONSLOAN 0.0005842 0.0008333 0.7 0.483 -0.0010495 0.0022179 
COMMLOAN 0.0015203 0.0008076 1.88 0.060 -0.0000629 0.0031036 
MORTLOAN 0.0002576 0.0004301 0.6 0.549 -0.0005857 0.0011008 
_cons -0.003395 0.0013919 2.40 0.016 -0.006107 0.060682 
Number of obs= 4358 
    
  
F( 23.  4334)= 50.63 
    
  
Prob > F= 0.000 
    
  
R-squared= 0.4594 
    
  
Root MSE= 0.00583  
  
   
Table 9: Regression of model 1 for the full sample from 2000-2015. ; LLP: Loan loss provision; ΔLOAN: Changes in the total 
outstanding loans; NPL: Nonperforming loans; ΔNPL: Changes in the value of non-performing loans from year t-1 to t; LCO: Net 
loan write-offs; LLA: Losses of loan allowance; INTR: Average rate of interest on the loans; TIER1: Tier 1 ratio f of the bank.GDP: 
Gross Domestic Product rate in USA in basic prices, in year t. COMMLOANS: The amount of commercial loans; CONSLOANS: The 
amount of consumer loans; MORTLOANS:  The amount of real estate loans. 
Table 10(Model 2 Sub-sample 2000-2007) 
AQ Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
BIG4 -0.0003807 0.0035721 -0.11 0.915 -0.0073875 0.0066262 
CIM 0.0002884 0.0006419 0.45 0.653 -0.0009707 0.0015476 
LIT 0.0001743 0.0042179 0.04 0.967 -0.0080993 0.0084479 
ACM -0.0038718 0.0040052 -0.97 0.334 -0.0117281 0.0039845 
HHI 0.0000146 0.0000874 0.17 0.867 -0.0001567 0.000186 
LIS 0.0000297 0.0022714 0.01 0.99 -0.0044258 0.0044852 
ROAA 0.0010185 0.0013622 0.75 0.455 -0.0016536 0.0036905 
CΑPR -0.0000818 0.0002191 -0.37 0.709 -0.0005116 0.0003481 
_cons -0.0356509 0.2074141 0.17 0.864 -0.4425005 0.371198 
Number of obs= 1525 
     F( 11.  1513)= 0.55 
     Prob > F= 0.8682 
     R-squared= 0.0044 
     Root MSE= 0.03633 
     Table 10: Regression of model 1 for the sub sample from 2000-2007. AQ : Is the quality of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it 
was measured by the model 1&2; BIG4 : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 0, 
otherwise; CIM: The importance of calculated according to the total assets.; ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee; HHI: 
Reflects the degree of concentration calculated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; LIT: Litigation against auditor company ; 
ROAA: The return on average assets ratio; CAPR: the Capital ratio; LIS: Is the quality y of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it 
was measured by the model 1&2. 
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Table 11(Model 2 Sub-sample 2008-2015) 
Table 11: Regression of model 1 for the sub sample from 2000-2007. AQ : Is the quality of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it was 
measured by the model 1&2; BIG4 : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 0, otherwise; CIM: 
The importance of calculated according to the total assets.; ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee; HHI: Reflects the degree of 
concentration calculated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; LIT: Litigation against auditor company ; ROAA: The return on average 
assets ratio; CAPR: the Capital ratio; LIS: Is the quality y of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it was measured by the model 1&2. 
Table 12(Model 2 Full-sample 2000-20015) 
AQ Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
BIG4 -0.000319 0.0015806 -0.2 0.84 -0.0034178 0.0027798 
LAS -0.0000212 0.0003277 -0.06 0.948 -0.0006637 0.0006212 
LIT 0.0004401 0.0009598 0.46 0.647 -0.0014417 0.0023219 
ACM -0.0034701 0.0018904 -1.84 0.066 -0.0071763 0.0002361 
HHI 0.0000158 0.0000291 0.54 0.587 -0.0000412 0.0000728 
LIS 0.0002821 0.0011561 0.24 0.807 -0.0019844 0.0025487 
ROAA 0.0008033 0.0006473 1.24 0.215 -0.0004657 0.0020723 
CPR -0.0000874 0.0001156 -0.76 0.45 -0.0003141 0.0001394 
_cons -0.033888 0.0711414 -0.48 0.634 -0.1733652 0.1055892 
Number of obs= 3988 
     F( 19.  3968)= 0.75 
     Prob > F= 0.7644 
     R-squared= 0.0032 
     Root MSE= 0.03429 
     Table 12: Regression of model 1 for the sub sample from 2000-2015. AQ : Is the quality of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it was 
measured by the model 1&2; BIG4 : Dummy 1 if the audit company that audit the bank i is a member of the Big 4; 0, otherwise; CIM: 
The importance of calculated according to the total assets.; ACM: The effectiveness of audit committee; HHI: Reflects the degree of 
concentration calculated with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; LIT: Litigation against auditor company ; ROAA: The return on average 
assets ratio; CAPR: the Capital ratio; LIS: Is the quality y of the audit in the bank i in the year t, as it was measured by the model 1&2.
AQ Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
BIG4 -0.0004514 0.0017866 -0.25 0.801 -0.0039548 0.0030521 
CIM -0.0001931 0.0003831 -0.5 0.614 -0.0009443 0.0005581 
LIT 0.0005069 0.0009751 0.52 0.603 -0.0014052 0.0024189 
ACM -0.0033057 0.0021647 -1.53 0.127 -0.0075505 0.0009391 
HHI 9.71E-06 0.0000277 0.35 0.726 -0.0000446 0.000064 
LIS 0.0004621 0.0013352 0.35 0.729 -0.0021561 0.0030803 
ROAA 0.0007058 0.0007308 0.97 0.334 -0.0007274 0.0021389 
CPR -0.0000841 0.0001247 -0.67 0.5 -0.0003286 0.0001604 
_cons -0.0161666 0.0675579 -0.24 0.811 -0.1486823 0.1163491 
Number of obs= 
     F( 14.  2448)= 0.6 
     Prob > F= 0.8644 
     R-squared= 0.0025 
     Root MSE= 0.03302 
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